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Abstract
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice,
matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional
feature that agents’ preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with uncer-
tainty leads to a number of interesting questions including the following ones.
How to compute an assignment with the highest probability of being Pareto
optimal? What is the complexity of computing the probability that a given
assignment is Pareto optimal? Does there exist an assignment that is Pareto
optimal with probability one? We consider these problems under two natural
uncertainty models: (1) the lottery model in which each agent has an inde-
pendent probability distribution over linear orders and (2) the joint probability
model that involves a joint probability distribution over preference profiles. For
both of the models, we present a number of algorithmic and complexity results
highlighting the difference and similarities in the complexity of the two models.
Keywords: Assignment Problem, Resource allocation, Pareto optimality,
Uncertain Preferences.
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
1. Introduction
When preferences of agents are aggregated to identify a desirable social out-
come, Pareto optimality is a minimal requirement. Pareto optimality stipulates
that there should not be another outcome that is at least as good for all agents
and better for at least one agent. We take Pareto optimality as a central concern
and consider a richer version of the classic assignment problem where the twist
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is that agents may express uncertainty in their preferences. The assignment
problem is a fundamental setting in which n agents express preferences over
n items and each agent is to be allocated one item. The setting is a classical
one in discrete allocation. Its axiomatic and computational aspects have been
well-studied [2, 6, 3, 9, 10, 15, 21, 22]. Our motivation for studying assignment
with uncertain preferences is that agents’ preferences may not be completely
known because of a lack of information or communication.
Our work is inspired by the recent work of Aziz et al. [5] who examined the
stable marriage problem under uncertain preferences. Uncertainty in prefer-
ences has already been studied in voting [16]. Similarly, in auction theory, it is
standard to examine Bayesian settings in which there is probability distribution
over the types of the agents. Although computational aspects of Pareto optimal
outcomes have been intensely studied in various settings such as assignment,
matching, housing markets, and committee voting [3, 8, 9, 7, 12, 17, 18, 19],
there has not been much work on Pareto optimal under uncertain preferences.
When agents have uncertain preferences, one can relax the goal of computing a
Pareto optimal outcome and focus on computing outcomes that have the highest
probability of being Pareto optimal. We will abbreviate Pareto optimal as PO.
If an assignment is Pareto optimal with probability one, we will call it certainly
PO.
We consider the following uncertainty models:
• Lottery Model: For each agent, we are given a probability distribution
over linear preferences.
• Joint Probability Model: A probability distribution over linear prefer-
ence profiles is specified.
Note that both the lottery model and the joint probability model represen-
tation can be exponential in the number of agents but if the support of the
probability distributions is small, then the representation is compact. Also note
that the product of the independent uncertain preferences in the lottery model
results in a probability distribution over preference profiles and hence can be
represented in the joint probability model. However, the change in representa-
tion can result in a blowup. Thus whereas the joint probability model is more
general than the lottery model, it is not as compact. In view of this, complexity
results for one model do not directly carry over to results for the other model.
The most natural computational problems that we will consider are as fol-
lows.
• PO-Probability: what is the probability that a given assignment is PO?
• AssignmentWithHighestPO-Probability: compute an assignment
with the highest probability of being PO.
We also consider simpler problems than PO-Probability:
• IsPO-ProbabilityNon-Zero: for a given assignment, is the probability
of being PO non-zero?
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• IsPO-ProbabilityOne: for a given assignment, is the probability of
being PO one?
We also consider a problem connected to AssignmentWithHighestPO-
Probability: ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment asks whether there ex-
ists an assignment that has probability one for being PO. Note that
ExistsPossiblyPO-Assignment—the problem of checking whether there ex-
ists some PO assignment with non-zero probability—is trivial for all uncertainty
models in which the induced ‘certainly preferred’ relation is acyclic. The reason
why it is trivial is because the certainly preferred relation can be completed in a
way so that it is transitive and then for the completed deterministic preferences,
there exists at least one PO assignment.
We say that a given uncertainty model is independent if any uncertain pref-
erence profile L under the model can be written as a product of uncertain
preferences La for all agents a, where all La’s are independent [5]. Note that
the lottery model is independent but the joint probability model is not.
Results. We show that for both the lottery model and the joint probability
model, ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is NP-complete. We also prove that
AssignmentWithHighestPO-Probability is NP-hard for both models. In
view of the results, we see that as we move from deterministic preferences to
uncertain preferences, the complexity of computing Pareto optimal assignments
jumps significantly. On the other hand, we show that for a general class of un-
certainty models called independent uncertainty models, both problems IsPO-
ProbabilityNon-Zero and IsPO-ProbabilityOne can be solved in linear
time. Whereas PO-Probability is polynomial-time solvable for the joint prob-
ability model, we prove that the problem #P-complete for the lottery model.
Even for the lottery model, the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable if
there is a constant number of uncertain agents.
Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Lottery Joint Probability
Model Model
Problems
PO-Probability
#P-complete in P
but in FPT (parameter
# uncertain agents)
IsPO-ProbabilityNon-Zero in P in P
IsPO-ProbabilityOne in P in P
ExistsPossiblyPO-Assignment
in P in P
(trivially exists) (trivially exists)
ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment NP-complete NP-complete
AssignmentWithHighestPO-Prob NP-hard NP-hard
Table 1: Summary of results.
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2. Preliminaries
The setting we consider is the assignment problem which is a triple (N,O,≻)
where N is the set of n agents {1, . . . , n}, O = {o1, . . . , on} is the set of items,
and ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) specifies complete, asymmetric, and transitive preferences
≻i of each agent i over O. We will denote by R(O) as the set of all complete
and transitive relations over the set of items O. We will denote by ≻S as the
preference profile of agents from set S ⊂ N .
An assignment is an allocation of items to agents, represented as an n × n
matrix [p(i)(oj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n such that for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, p(i)(oj) ∈
{0, 1}; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1. An agent i gets item oj if
and only if p(i)(oj) = 1. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(om)) represents the
allocation of agent i.
An assignment p is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another assignment
q such that q(i) %i p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻i p(i) for some i ∈ N .
We first note a couple of well-known characterisations of Pareto
optimal assignments. An assignment p admits a trading cycle
o0, i0, o1, i1, . . . , ok−1, ik−1, o0 in which p(ij)(oj) > 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
oj+1 mod k ≻j oj mod k for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Fact 1 (Folklore). An assignment is Pareto optimal if and only if it does not
admit a trading cycle.
We will also use the following characterization of Pareto optimal discrete
assignments [1] that is defined with respect to outcomes of serial dictatorship.
Serial dictatorship is an assignment mechanism that is specified with respect to
a permutation π over N : agents in the permutation are given the most preferred
item that is still not allocated. We will denote by SD(N,O,≻, π) the outcome
of applying serial dictatorship with respect to permutation π over assignment
problem (N,O,≻).
Fact 2 (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1]). An assignment is Pareto optimal if
and only if it is an outcome of serial dictatorship.
Fact 2 also follows from Proposition 1 by Brams and King [11]. The facts
above show that when preferences are deterministic, a Pareto optimal assign-
ment can be computed or verified easily. We will now focus on similar problems
but with the feature that agents have uncertain preferences.
Example 1.
1 : a, b, c (0.6)
b, a, c (0.4)
2 : b, a, c
3 : c, b, a
Consider the assignment abc in which 1 gets a, 2 gets b, and 3 gets c. The
probability of the assignment being Pareto optimal is 1. On the other hand, the
assignment bac has 0.4 probability of being Pareto optimal.
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3. Joint Probability Model
We first observe that the PO-Probability can be solved easily for the joint
probability model.
Theorem 1. For the joint probability model, PO-Probability can be solved
in polynomial time.
Proof. The probability that a given assignment is PO is equivalent to the prob-
ability weight of the preference profiles for which the assignment is PO. This
can be checked as follows. We check the preference profiles for which the given
assignment is PO (for one profile, this can be checked in linear time). Then we
add the probabilities of those profiles for which the assignment is PO. The sum
of the probabilities is the probability that the assignment is PO.
Corollary 1. For the joint probability model, IsPO-ProbabilityNon-Zero
and IsPO-ProbabilityOne can be solved in polynomial time.
What about ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment? This problem is equiva-
lent to checking whether the sets of PO assignments have a non-empty inter-
section. We show that this problem is NP-complete even when the probability
distribution is over two linear preference profiles.
We reduce from the NP-complete problem SerialDictatorship-
Feasibility—check whether there exists a permutation of agents for which
serial dictatorship gives a particular item o to an agent i [20].
SerialDictatorshipFeasibility
Input: (N,O,≻, i ∈ N, o ∈ O)
Question: Does there exist a permutation of agents for which serial
dictatorship gives a particular item o to an agent i?
For linear preference profiles, the set of Pareto optimal allocations are char-
acterized by those that can be achieved via some serial dictatorship. Thus it
follows that the following problem is also NP-complete: check whether there
exists a Pareto optimal allocation in which a specified agent i gets a specified
item o.
Theorem 2. For the joint probability model, ExistsCertainlyPO-
Assignment is NP-complete even when the probability distribution is over two
linear preference profiles.
Proof. The problem ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is in NP because it
can be checked in polynomial time whether a given assignment is certainly PO
or not (Theorem 1).
To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete problem : Serial-
DictatorshipFeasibility — given (N,O,≻), check whether there exists a
permutation of agents for which serial dictatorship gives a particular item o to
an agent i [20].
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We construct a joint probability over two preference profiles. One of the
profiles is the same as ≻. In the other preference profile ≻′, agent i has o as the
most preferred item and has the same order of preference over all other items
as in ≻i. Each agent j ∈ N \ {i} has o as the least preferred item. As for the
other items, each j ∈ N \ {i} has the same preferences over the items in O \ {o}
as in ≻j.
Our first observation is that an assignment is PO under profile ≻′ only if i
gets o in it.
Claim 1. An assignment is PO under profile ≻′ only if i gets o in it.
Proof. The argument is as follows. If i does not get o, then an agent j 6= i
gets it. However both i and j get a more preferred item under profile ≻′ by
exchanging their items.
We now prove that we have a yes instance of SerialDictatorshipFeasi-
bility if and only if there exists a certainly PO assignment.
Assume that there exists a certainly PO assignment. Then, it must be PO
under ≻′ implying that, by our claim above, i gets o in this assignment. The
same assignment must also be PO under profile ≻ which implies that there
exists an assignment that is PO under profile ≻ in which i gets o. In light
of Fact 2, this implies that there exists a serial dictatorship the outcome of
which under profile ≻ is the same assignment. Hence, we have a yes instance of
SerialDictatorshipFeasibility.
Now consider the case when we have a yes instance of SerialDictator-
shipFeasibility. This means that there is a permutation π under which i gets
o when serial dictatorship is run. Let us call this assignment by p. Due to
Fact 2, p is PO under preference profile ≻. We want to prove that p is PO
under each possible preference profile. We already know that it is PO under
≻ so it remains to show that it is PO under ≻′. Due to Fact 2, it is sufficient
to prove that for profile ≻′, there exists a corresponding permutation of agents
under which the outcome of serial dictatorship is p.
In fact, we show that for SD(N,O,≻′, π) = p—i.e., the outcome of applying
serial dictatorship with permutation π is p even if the preference profile is ≻′
instead of ≻. In order to prove the statement we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. The following are the same at each round, when applying serial dic-
tatorship to profiles ≻ and ≻′, in both cases with respect to permutation π.
• the order in which items are allocated.
• the allocation of each agent.
• set of remaining items.
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Proof. The claim can be proved via induction on the number of rounds of serial
dictatorship. For the base case, let us consider agent π(1). If π(1) = i, then
π(1) picks up o under both preference profiles. This is because, by construction
(1) π is a permutation under which i gets o when serial dictatorship is applied
on ≻, and (2) i has o as his most preferred item under ≻′. If π(1) 6= i, then
π(1) picks up some item o′ 6= o in p = SD(N,O,≻, π). Note that for π(1), his
most preferred item in both profiles must be o′. Hence by the end of the first
round, the same item has been given to the same agent in both ≻ and ≻′.
For the induction, let us assume that k rounds have taken place and the
order in which items are allocated, the allocation of each agent in the first k
round and the set of unallocated items T is the same under both profiles ≻ and
≻′. Now consider agent π(k + 1). If π(k + 1) = i, then i picks up item o under
≻, implying that o ∈ T , which in turn implies that i must pick up o under ≻′
since o is his most preferred item in O under preference ≻′i and hence his most
preferred item in T . It remains to show what happens when π(k + 1) 6= i. In
that case π(k+1) picks up some item o′ 6= o in SD(N,O,≻, π). This means that
o′ is the most preferred item of agent π(k + 1) in set T ⊂ O under preference
profile ≻, implying that o′ is the most preferred item of agent π(k+1) in set T
under preference profile ≻′ as well. This completes the proof of the claim.
We have thus proved that the outcome of applying serial dictatorship with
respect to permutation π is p under both preference profiles ≻ and ≻′. Thus p
is PO under both possibly realizable preference profiles. To conclude, we have
proved there exists a certainly PO assignment if and only if we have a yes in-
stance of SerialDictatorshipFeasibility. Since SerialDictatorshipFea-
sibility is NP-complete, it follows that ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is
NP-complete.
Corollary 2. For the joint probability model, AssignmentWithHighestPO-
Prob is NP-hard.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to
solveAssignmentWithHighestPO-Prob. In that case, we can compute such
an assignment p. By Corollary 1, it can be checked in polynomial time whether
p is PO with probability one or not. If p is PO with probability one, then we
know that we have a yes instance of ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment. Oth-
erwise, we have a no instance of ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment. Hence
ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is polynomial-time solvable, a contradic-
tion.
Before dealing with the lottery model, we present some general algorithmic
results that apply not just to the lottery model but a class of uncertainty models
that includes the lottery model.
4. Independent Uncertainty Models
We first present a couple of general results that apply to a large class of
uncertainty models that satisfy independence. Recall that a given uncertainty
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model is independent if any uncertain preference profile L under the model can
be written as a product of uncertain preferences La for all agents a, where all
La’s are independent.
We first define the certainly preferred relation ≻certaini for agent i. We write
b ≻certaini c if and only if agent i prefers b over c with probability 1.
Theorem 3. For any independent uncertainty model in which the certainly
preferred relation can be computed in polynomial given, given an assignment it
can be checked in polynomial-time whether another assignment Pareto dominates
it with probability one.
Proof. Given an assignment ω, we create a trading cycle graph G in which each
agent i points to any item o such that o ≻certaini ω(i). We now claim that
there exists a cycle in G if and only if the assignment ω is Pareto optimal with
probability zero.
If there exists a cycle in G, then another assignment Pareto dominates ω
with probability one. The reason is that each agent prefers the item he points
to with probability one. Hence, if we implement the trade in the cycle, each
agent in the cycle gets a certainly more preferred item. Therefore the assignment
is Pareto dominated with probability one.
Now suppose that there is an assignment that Pareto dominates ω with
probability one. Equivalently, there exists another assignment in which each
agent with a different allocation gets a certainly strictly more preferred item.
But this means that there exists a cycle in G.
Theorem 4. For any independent uncertainty model, IsPO-ProbabilityOne
can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Given an assignment ω, we create a trading cycle graph G in which each
agent i points to any item o such that ω(i) 6≻certaini o. We claim that ω is Pareto
optimal with probability one if and only if G does not contain a cycle.
We first show that if there exists a cycle, then it is not the case that ω is PO
with probability one. Existence of a cycle implies that each agent in the cycle
prefers another item to what he has received with non-zero probability, which
in turn implies that if we implement the cycle then each of these agents will
receive a more preferred item with non-zero probability. Therefore ω is Pareto
dominated with non-zero probability.
If it is not the case that ω is Pareto optimal with probability one, then
it must be that that another assignment Pareto dominates it with non-zero
probability. Equivalently, there exists another assignment in which each agent
with a different allocation gets a different item that is more preferred with non-
zero probability. But this means that there exists a cycle in G.
5. Lottery Model
We now focus on the lottery model. Since the lottery model is a independent
uncertainty model, Theorems 3 and 4 apply to it.
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Theorem 5. For the lottery uncertainty model, IsPO-ProbabilityNon-Zero
can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider an assignment p that we want check whether it is PO with
non-zero probability. We use the following algorithm that can be considered
as building a permutation of agents that is consistent with serial dictatorship
producing the assignment p.
Initialize the set of remaining items to O, the remaining agents to
N , and the permutation of the agents π to an empty list. Check
if there exists some agent i such that p(i) is an available item that
is the most preferred for i in at least one of his preference lists. If
no such agent exists, return no. If such an agent exists, give the
item to him, append i to the permutation π, remove i from the
set of remaining agents, and remove p(i) from the set of available
items. Also select the preference of agent i that had p(i) as the most
preferred remaining item, denoting it by ≻i. Repeat until no more
items are left.
If the algorithm builds the whole permutation and does not return no, then
we claim p is Pareto optimal with non-zero probability. When an agent i picks
the item p(i) in his turn, it means that the agent has at least one possible
preference, ≻i, in which p(i) is the most preferred remaining item. Hence when
applying serial dictatorship to the selected preference profile ≻ with respect to
π, each agent i picks p(i) when his turn comes, resulting in p as the outcome of
serial dictatorship, hence implying that p is PO with respect to ≻ and therefore
PO with non-zero probability.
If the algorithm returns no, we argue that p is PO with zero probability.
Consider the first point in the algorithm where no agent i has p(i) as an available
item that is the most preferred for i in at least one of his preference lists. This
means that no remaining agent gets his most preferred item (for any preference
list) among the available items. Therefore, for each realisation of the preferences
profiles, each of the remaining agents is interested in and points to another item
held by another agent among the remaining agents. This implies the existence
of a trading cycle for each realisation of the preference profiles, where some
remaining agents can exchange items among themselves to get a more preferred
item than in p. Thus p is PO with zero probability.
We now prove that the problem of checking whether there exists an assign-
ment that is PO with probability one is NP-complete. Although the proof is
similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we give a complete argument since a com-
plexity result for the joint probability model does not directly imply a similar
result for the lottery model.
Theorem 6. For the lottery model, ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is NP-
complete.
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Proof. The problem ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is in NP because it
can be checked in polynomial time whether a given assignment is certainly PO
or not (Theorem 4). To prove NP-hardness, we use an argument similar to that
used in the proof of Theorem 2.
We reduce from the NP-complete problem : SerialDictatorshipFeasi-
bility — given an assignment setting (N,O,≻), check whether there exists a
permutation of agents for which serial dictatorship gives a particular item o to
an agent i [20].
We construct preferences in which each agent j ∈ N has two preference lists
where one of them is ≻j . For agent i, we add another preference list ≻′i in which
i’s most preferred item is o and the rest of the items are in the same order as
in ≻i. For each other agent j ∈ N \ {i}, we add a preference list ≻′j which is
identical to ≻j except that o is moved to the end of the list.
Our first observation is that an assignment is PO under profile ≻′ only if i
gets o in it. If i does not get o, and agent j 6= i gets it, then both i and j get a
more preferred item under profile ≻′ by exchanging their items. Hence if there
is any assignment that is certainly PO then it must give o to i.
We prove that there exists a certainly PO assignment if and only if we have
a yes instance of SerialDictatorshipFeasibility.
If we have a no instance of SerialDictatorshipFeasibility, then in no
assignment that is PO under ≻ agent i gets o. On the other hand, an assignment
is PO under ≻′ only if i receives o. Therefore, there does not exist any certainly
PO assignment.
Now consider the case when we have a yes instance of SerialDictator-
shipFeasibility. This means that there is a permutation π under which i gets
o when serial dictatorship is run. Let us call this assignment p. Due to Fact 2,
p is PO under preference profile ≻. We want to prove that p is PO under each
possible preference profile. Due to Fact 2 it is sufficient to prove that for each
possible realizable preference profile, there exists a corresponding permutation
of agents under which the outcome of serial dictatorship is p.
In fact, we show that for each possible preference profile ≻′′, SD(N,O,≻′′
, π) = p i.e., the outcome of applying serial dictatorship with permutation π is
p. In order to prove the statement we prove the following claim. (Note that p
is PO under ≻ with respect to π.)
Claim 3. The following are the same at each round, when applying serial dicta-
torship to ≻ and any of the realizable preference profiles ≻′′, in both cases with
respect to permutation π
• the order in which items are allocated.
• the allocation of each agent.
• set of remaining items.
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Proof. The claim can be proved via induction on the number of rounds of serial
dicatorship. For the base case, let us consider agent π(1). If π(1) = i, then π(1)
picks up o in all his possible preferences. This is because, by construction (1) π
is a permutation under which i gets o when serial dictatorship is applied on ≻,
so it must be that i ranks o at the top of his list under ≻i and (2) i has o as his
most preferred item under ≻′i by construction. If π(1) 6= i, then π(1) picks up
some item o′ 6= o in p = SD(N,O,≻, π). Note that for π(1), his most preferred
item is the same in all possible profiles. Hence by the end of the first round, the
same item has been given to the same agent in all the realizable preferences.
For the induction, let us assume that k rounds have taken place and the order
in which items are allocated, the allocation of each agent in the first k turns and
the set of unallocated items T is the same all the realizable preferences. Now
consider the agent π(k + 1). If π(k + 1) = i, then i picks up item o under ≻,
implying that o ∈ T , which in turn implies that i must pick o under ≻′i since o is
his most preferred item in O under ≻′i and hence his most preferred item in T .
It remains to show what happens when π(k+1) 6= i. In that case π(k+1) picks
some item o′ 6= o in SD(N,O,≻, π). This means that o′ is the most preferred
item of agent π(k + 1)in set T ⊂ O of agent π(k + 1) under preference list
≻π(k+1), implying that o
′ is the most preferred item of agent π(k + 1) in set T
under preference ≻′
π(k+1) as well. This completes the proof of the claim.
We have thus proved that the outcome of applying serial dictatorship with
respect to permutation π is p under all possible preference profiles. Thus p is
PO under each possibly realizable preference profile when we have a yes instance
of SerialDictatorshipFeasibility.
To conclude, we have proved there exists a certainly PO assignment if and
only if we have a yes instance of SerialDictatorshipFeasibility. Since
SerialDictatorshipFeasibility is NP-hard and ExistsCertainlyPO-
Assignment is in NP, it follows that ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is
NP-complete.
Corollary 3. For the lottery model, AssignmentWithHighestPO-Prob is
NP-hard.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to
solveAssignmentWithHighestPO-Prob. In that case, we can compute such
an assignment p. By Theorem 4, it can be checked in polynomial time whether
p is PO with probability one or not. If p is PO with probability one, then we
know that we have a yes instance of ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment. Oth-
erwise, we have a no instance of ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment. Hence
ExistsCertainlyPO-Assignment is polynomial-time solvable, a contradic-
tion.
In light of Theorem 5 and Theorem 4, we know that for the lottery model,
it can be checked in polynomial time whether the PO probability of a given as-
signment is zero or one, respectively. We now turn to the problem of computing
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the probability that a given assignment is PO. We first present a polynomial-
time solution for a restricted setting, and then show that PO-Probability is
#P-complete for the lottery model in general.
Theorem 7. For the lottery model, if the number of uncertain agents in con-
stant, then PO-Probability is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Let ω be a given assignment. Let constant k denote the number of
uncertain agents, and let the maximum number of preferences for any uncertain
agent be ℓ. Therefore, the maximum number of preference profiles that are
realizable is ℓk which is still polynomial in the input since k = O(1). For each
possible preference profile ≻, it is easy to compute the probability of ω being
stable under ≻ by simply computing the product of the probabilities of the
preferences chosen of the uncertain agents. Hence, we have reduced the problem
to the problem PO-Probability for the joint probability model which can be
solved in polynomial time (Theorem 1).
Theorem 8. For the lottery model, PO-Probability is #P-complete, even
when restricted to the case where each agent has at most two possible preferences.
Proof. We show #P-hardness by reduction from the #P-complete problem
Monotone-#2SAT—count the number of satisfying assignments for a 2CNF
formula that contains no negation [23].
Monotone-#2SAT
Input: A 2CNF formula that contains no negation.
Question: Count the number of satisfying assignments.
Let ϕ be a monotone 2CNF formula with clauses c1, . . . , cm and variables
x1, . . . , xn. We construct an instance of PO-Probability as follows. Consider
agents 1, . . . , n and items o1, . . . , on, and take the assignment σ that gives each
agent i item oi.
We construct the preferences of the agents as follows. Take an arbitrary
agent i. Consider the set {j1, . . . , ju} of indices j such that the clause (xi ∨ xj)
occurs in ϕ. (Without loss of generality, this set {j1, . . . , ju} is non-empty.)
Suppose that j1 < j2 < · · · < ju, in order to fix an (arbitrary) order over these
indices. With probability 12 , agent i has oi at the top of his preference list,
followed by the rest of the items in arbitrary order. With probability 12 , agent i
has the following preference: oj1 ≻i · · · ≻i oju ≻i oi ≻i · · · , where the remaining
items appear in arbitrary order after oi.
This way, the possible preference profiles correspond one-to-one to the pos-
sible truth assignments over x1, . . . , xn. Namely, taking the preference oi ≻i · · ·
for agent i corresponds to setting xi to 1, and taking the other preference for
agent i corresponds to setting xi to 0. Moreover, each possible preference profile
occurs with probability 12n .
We show that the number of satisfying assignments for ϕ is equal to the
number of preference profiles under which σ is Pareto optimal. In particular,
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we show that σ is PO under a preference profile if and only if the corresponding
truth assignment T satisfies ϕ.
( =⇒ ) Take a possible preference profile≻ under which σ is PO and suppose,
for a contradiction, that the corresponding truth assignment T does not satisfy
ϕ. That is, there is some clause c = (xi ∨xj) that is not satisfied, implying that
in T both xi and xj are set to 0. Then we know that agent i prefers oj to oi
and agent j prefers oi to oj , hence they are willing to swap their assigned items.
Therefore σ is not Pareto optimal under ≻, a contradiction.
(⇐=) Take a possible preference profile ≻ and suppose that the correspond-
ing truth assignment T satisfies ϕ. We show that we cannot find a Pareto
improvement of σ, implying that σ is PO. Take an arbitrary agent i. First sup-
pose that T sets xi to 1. This means that agent i prefers oi to all other items,
and so he is not willing to exchange it with another item. Now, suppose that T
sets xi to 0. Take the set {j1, . . . , ju} of indices such that the clause (xi ∨ xj)
occurs in ϕ. As xi is set to 0, this means that i prefers oj1 , . . . , oju to oi and is
willing to exchange oi with either of these items (but no other item). Because
T satisfies ϕ, we know that T sets xj1 , . . . , xju to 1, and consequently, agents
j1, . . . , ju prefer items oj1 , . . . , oju over all other items (respectively). So neither
of these agents is willing to exchange their assigned item with oi. Therefore, as
no Pareto improvement exists, σ is Pareto optimal.
The number of satisfying truth assignments of ϕ is then exactly equal to
2n times the probability that assignment σ is Pareto optimal. Thus, PO-
Probability is #P-hard, even when restricted to the case where each agent
has at most two possible preferences.
Next, we argue that PO-Probability is in #P. Technically speaking, the
class #P consists of counting problems, which are functions f : Σ∗ → N. We
can consider PO-Probability as such a function producing natural numbers
in the following way. Without loss of generality, suppose that the probabilities
in the input are all given as rational numbers with the same denominator d.
(We can transform the input in polynomial time to an equivalent input that
satisfies this property.) Then the probability that the given assignment is Pareto
optimal is z
dn
for some positive integer z. We then consider the problem PO-
Probability as the function that returns z, rather than the rational z
dn
.
We argue membership in #P by describing a nondeterministic Turing ma-
chineM that has the property that for each input, the number of accepting paths
ofM for this input equals the number z that corresponds to the probability that
the given matching is Pareto optimal. The existence of such a Turing machine
implies membership in #P [23]. The machine M operates as follows. For each
agent ai, it uses nondeterminism to generate d different (partial) computation
paths. These partial computation paths are concatenated, resulting in dn to-
tal computation paths. Suppose that the input specifies ℓ possible preference
orders for agent ai, occurring with probabilities
u1
d
, . . . , uℓ
d
, respectively. Then
the first u1 partial computation paths generated for ai correspond to the first
preference order, the next u2 correspond to the second order, and so on. As a
result, each total computation path corresponds to some preference profile. At
the end of each computation path, the machine M checks (in deterministic poly-
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nomial time) whether the assignment is Pareto optimal for the corresponding
preference profile, and accepts if and only if this is the case. It is straightforward
to verify that the number of accepting computation paths of M is exactly the
number z such that the probability that the assignment is Pareto optimal is z
dn
.
Therefore, we know that PO-Probability is in #P.
We showed that when there are only a constant number of uncertain agents,
we can compute the PO probability in polynomial time for the lottery model
(Theorem 7). However, the order of the polynomial that upper bounds the
running time of our proposed algorithm grows with the number of uncertain
agents. In particular, when k is the number of uncertain agents, and ℓ is the
maximum number of possible preference orders for these uncertain agents, the
running time of the algorithm outlined in the proof of Theorem 7 is Ω(ℓk). We
improve on this result by showing that there exists a fixed-parameter tractable
algorithm that computes the PO probability for the lottery model—that is, an
algorithm running in time f(k)nc for some computable function f and some
fixed constant c independent of k, where n denotes the input size. In other
words, we show that the parameterized problem k-PO-Probability, where
the parameter is the number of uncertain agents, is fixed-parameter tractable
for the lottery model.
Theorem 9. For the lottery model, k-PO-Probability can be solved in fixed-
parameter tractable time.
Proof. Take an arbitrary instance of the problem k-PO-Probability, con-
sisting of agents 1, . . . , n, objects o1, . . . , on, and an assignment σ. Without
loss of generality, assume that the assignment gives each agent i the object oi,
and that the uncertain agents are agents 1, . . . , k. For each uncertain agent i,
let ≻i,1, . . . ,≻i,ui denote the different possible preferences for agent i.
Additionally, assume without loss of generality that for each of the uncertain
agents 1, . . . , k, each of the possible preferences for these agents occurs with
probability ℓ
d
, where the numerator ℓ can vary between different agents and
different possible preferences, but where the denominator d is common among all
agents and all possible preferences. In other words, all probabilities mentioned
in the instance are rational numbers that share a common denominator d. If
this were not the case, we could straightforwardly transform the instance in
polynomial time to an equivalent instance that does satisfy this property.
Also, assume without loss of generality that there exists no trading cycle that
involves only the agents ok+1, . . . , on. If this were the case, the assignment is
Pareto optimal with probability zero, and we can filter out such trivial instances
using a polynomial-time preprocessing procedure.
We now how to compute the probability that the given assignment is Pareto
optimal in fixed-parameter tractable time. Our computation will proceed in
three stages:
(1) We construct a directed graph G with O(ku2k
2
) vertices, where the edges
are weighted. Here u denotes the maximum number of possible preferences
for any uncertain agent.
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(2) We count the number of homomorphisms f of a directed path P2k+2 of
length 2k + 2 to this graph G, where each homomorphism is counted
multiple times according to (the product of) the weights on the edges
in f(P2k+2). This counting can be done in polynomial time using an
extension of a known algorithm [13, 14].
(3) We divide the weighted total number of homomorphisms of P2k+2 to G
by the number dk to obtain the probability that the given assignment is
Pareto optimal.
We begin with phase (1), and we construct the weighted, directed graph G.
Let Π = {o1, . . . , ok}
2 be the set of all possible pairs (oi, oj) of objects
among o1, . . . , ok. We define the set V of vertices of G as follows. First, we
define an auxiliary set V ′:
V ′ = {1, . . . , k + 1} ∪ {(i,≻i,j) | i ∈ [k + 1], j ∈ [ui]}.
Then, we define the set V of vertices as follows:
V = {s, t} ∪ {(v′,Π′) | v′ ∈ V ′,Π′ ⊆ Π}.
That is, the graph G has vertices s and t, and 2k
2
copies of each element in V ′
(one for each Π′ ⊆ Π). Intuitively, the vertices s and t will act as source and
target for each homomorphism of P2k+2 to G.
The sets Π′ ⊆ Π will intuitively be used to memorize the ‘trading paths’
(i.e., paths in the trading cycle graph) that result from particular choices of the
preference orders ≻i,j chosen for the agents 1, . . . , k. That is, each (oi, oj) ∈ Π′
corresponds to a path from oi to oj in the directed graph with vertices o1, . . . , on
where there is an edge from oi′ to oi′′ if and only if agent i
′ prefers object oi′′
to object oi′ .
We construct the set E of (weighted and directed) edges as follows.
• We add an edge with weight 1 from s to (1, ∅).
• For each i ∈ [k], each j ∈ [ui], and each Π′ ⊆ Π, we add an edge from (i,Π′)
to (i,≻i,j ,Π′). This edge has weight ℓ, where the possible preference
order ≻i,j for agent i occurs with probability
ℓ
d
.
• For each i ∈ [k], each j ∈ [ui], and each Π′ ⊆ Π, we add an edge with
weight 1 from (i,≻i,j ,Π′) to the vertex (i + 1,Π′′), for some Π′ ⊆ Π′′ ⊆
Π. The choice of Π′′ is determined as follows. Consider the follow-
ing graph GΠ′,≻i,j . The vertices of this graph are o1, . . . , on. For each
pair (oi′ , oi′′) of vertices among ok+1, . . . , on, there is an edge from oi′
to oi′′ if and only if agent j prefers object oi′′ to object oi′ . Moreover,
for each (oi′ , oi′′) ∈ Π
′, we add an edge from oi′ to oi′′ . Finally, for each
agent oi′ among ok+1, . . . , on, we add an edge from oi to oi′ if and only
if oi′ ≻i,j oi. We then let Π′′ ⊆ Π be the set of all pairs (oi′ , oi′′) such that
there is a path from oi′ to oi′′ in GΠ′,≻i,j . Clearly, Π
′ ⊆ Π′′.
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• For each Π′ ⊆ Π such that (oi, oi) 6∈ Π′ for all i among 1, . . . , k, we add
an edge with weight 1 from (k + 1,Π′) to t.
Clearly, any homomorphism f from the directed path P2k+2 of length 2k+2
to G must map the first vertex of the path to s and the last vertex of the path
to t. Each such homomorphism must map the (2i)-th vertex of the path to some
vertex (i,Π′) and the (2i+ 1)-th vertex of the path to some vertex (i,≻i,j,Π
′).
Also, the (2k+2)-th vertex of the path must be mapped to some vertex (k+1,Π′)
where Π′ contains no pair (oi, oi). These observations follows directly from the
construction of G.
Moreover, each homomorphism f ′ from the directed path P2k+1 of
length 2k+1 to G that maps the first vertex of the path to s is uniquely deter-
mined by some series of choices ≻1,j1 , . . . ,≻k,jk for the possible preferences of
the uncertain agents 1, . . . , k. We argue that such a homomorphism f ′ can be
extended to a homomorphism f from P2k+2 to G if and only if the corresponding
preferences≻1,j1 , . . . ,≻k,jk lead to a trading cycle. The homomorphism f
′ maps
the (2k+2)-th vertex of the path to some pair (k+1,Π′). Here Π′ is the set of
pairs (oi, oj) ∈ {o1, . . . , ok}2 such that the preferences ≻1,j1 , . . . ,≻k,jk lead to a
trading path from oi to oj . By our assumption that there exists no trading cycle
that involves only the agents ok+1, . . . , on, we know that the set Π
′ contains some
pair (oi, oi) if and only if there exists a trading cycle. Therefore, by construction
of the edges between (k+1,Π′) and t, we know that the choices ≻1,j1 , . . . ,≻k,jk
of preferences for the agents 1, . . . , k that make the assignment Pareto optimal
are in one-to-one correspondence with the homomorphisms f from P2k+2 to G.
We count each such homomorphism f in a weighted fashion as follows—
this is phase (2). Take a homomorphism f from P2k+2 to G. Its weight in
the grand total is the product of the weights for each edge in f(P2k+2). The
only edges in f(P2k+2) that have weigth > 1 are edges from (i,Π
′) to (i,≻i,j
,Π′). Such an edge has weight ℓ, where the probability that ≻i,j occurs is
ℓ
d
.
From this, it is straightforward to verify that the total weighted sum of all
homomorphisms is equal to p · dk, where p is the probability that the given
assignment is Pareto optimal. Therefore, in order to compute p, we only need
to take the weighted sum of all homomorphisms, and divide it by dk—this is
phase (3) of the algorithm.
All that remains is to show how we can compute the weighted sum of all
homomorphisms f from P2k+2 to G in polynomial time. We can do this by
extending a known polynomial-time algorithm to count the number of homo-
morphisms of a graph whose treewidth is bounded by a fixed constant into
another graph [14, Theorem 14.7]. Since paths have treewidth 1, counting the
number of homomorphisms from a path to another graph can be done in poly-
nomial time using this algorithm. This algorithm uses a dynamic programming
approach to count the number of homomorphisms. This dynamic programming
technique can straightforwardly be extended to take into account the weights
of the homomorphisms. (We omit a detailed description of the extended algo-
rithm.)
This concludes our proof that k-PO-Probability can be solved in fixed-
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parameter tractable time for the lottery model.
6. Conclusions
Computing Pareto optimal outcomes is an active line of research in eco-
nomics and computer science. In this paper, we examined the problem for an
assignment setting where the preferences of the agents are uncertain. Our cen-
tral technical results are computational hardness results. We see that as we
move from deterministic preferences to uncertain preferences, the complexity
of computing Pareto optimal outcomes jumps significantly. The computational
hardness results carry over to more complex models in which there may be more
items than agents, agents may have capacities, and items may have copies. For
future work, we are also starting to consider other uncertainty models [5]. If
we consider the compact indifference model [5] which is an independent uncer-
tainty model, then the results in Section 4 apply to it. If we allow for intransitive
preferences, even a possibly Pareto optimal assignment may not exist and the
problem of checking whether a possible Pareto optimal assignment exists be-
comes interesting. An orthogonal but equally interesting direction will be to
consider other fairness, stability, or efficiency desiderata [4].
References
[1] Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., So¨nmez, T., 1998. Random serial dictatorship and the
core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica
66 (3), 689–701.
[2] Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., So¨nmez, T., 1999. House allocation with existing ten-
ants. Journal of Economic Theory 88 (2), 233–260.
[3] Abraham, D. J., Cechla´rova´, K., Manlove, D., Mehlhorn, K., 2005. Pareto
optimality in house allocation problems. In: Proceedings of the 16th Inter-
national Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC). Vol. 3341
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS). pp. 1163–1175.
[4] Aziz, H., 2016. Computational social choice: Some current and new di-
rections. In: Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). pp. 4054–4057.
[5] Aziz, H., Biro, P., Gaspers, S., de Haan, R., Mattei, N., Rastegari, B., 2016.
Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences. In: Proceedings of the
9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT).
[6] Aziz, H., Biro, P., Lang, J., Lesca, J., Monnot., J., 2016. Optimal reallo-
cation under additive and ordinal preferences. In: Proceedings of the 15th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS).
17
[7] Aziz, H., de Keijzer, B., 2012. Housing markets with indifferences: a tale of
two mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI). pp. 1249–1255.
[8] Aziz, H., Lang, J., Monnot., J., 2016. Computing Pareto Optimal Com-
mittees. In: Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
[9] Aziz, H., Mackenzie, S., Xia, L., Ye, C., 2015. Ex post efficiency of ran-
dom assignments. In: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). pp. 1639–1640.
[10] Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2001. A new solution to the random assign-
ment problem. Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2), 295–328.
[11] Brams, S. J., King, D. L., 2005. Efficient fair division: Help the worst off
or avoid envy? Rationality and Society 17 (4), 387–421.
[12] Erdil, A., Ergin, H., June 2015. Two-sided matching with indifferences.
[13] Flum, G., Grohe, M., 2004. The parameterized complexity of counting
problems. SIAM Journal on Computing 33 (4), 892–922.
[14] Flum, J., Grohe, M., 2006. Parameterized Complexity Theory. Texts in
Theoretical Computer Science. Springer-Verlag.
[15] Ga¨rdenfors, P., 1973. Assignment problem based on ordinal preferences.
Management Science 20, 331–340.
[16] Hazon, N., Aumann, Y., Kraus, S., Wooldridge, M., 2012. On the eval-
uation of election outcomes under uncertainty. Artificial Intelligence 189,
1–18.
[17] Krysta, P., Manlove, D., Rastegari, B., Zhang, J., 2014. Size versus truth-
fulness in the house allocation problem. In: Proceedings of the 15th ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC). ACM Press, pp.
453–470.
[18] Manlove, D., 2013. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences. World
Scientific Publishing Company.
[19] Saban, D., Sethuraman, J., 2013. House allocation with indifferences: a
generalization and a unified view. In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Con-
ference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC). ACM Press, pp. 803–820.
[20] Saban, D., Sethuraman, J., 2015. The complexity of computing the ran-
dom priority allocation matrix. Mathematics of Operations Research 40 (4),
1005 –1014.
[21] Svensson, L.-G., 1994. Queue allocation of indivisible goods. Social Choice
and Welfare 11, 323–330.
18
[22] Svensson, L.-G., 1999. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods. Social
Choice and Welfare 16 (4), 557–567.
[23] Valiant, L. G., 1979. The complexity of enumeration and reliability prob-
lems. SIAM Journal on Computing 8 (3), 410–421.
19
